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Abstract 
A major gap in our understanding of the medieval economy concerns interest rates, especially 
relating to commercial credit. Although direct evidence about interest rates is scattered and 
anecdotal, there is much more surviving information about exchange rates. Since both 
contemporaries and historians have suggested that exchange and rechange transactions could 
be used to disguise the charging of interest in order to circumvent the usury prohibition, it 
should be possible to back out the interest rates from exchange rates. The following analysis 
is based on a new dataset of medieval exchange rates collected from commercial 
correspondence in the archive of Francesco di Marco Datini of Prato, c.1383-1411. It 
demonstrates that the time value of money was consistently incorporated into market 
exchange rates. Moreover, these implicit interest rates are broadly comparable to those 
received from other types of commercial loan and investment. Although on average 
profitable, the return on any individual exchange and rechange transaction did involve a 
degree of uncertainty that may have justified their non-usurious nature.  However, there were 
also practical reasons why medieval merchants may have used foreign exchange transactions 
as a means of extending credit. 
                                                          
*
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2 
 
Cambium non est mutuum: exchange and interest rates in medieval Europe  
Today, interest rates are one of the most important economic variables. Ready access to credit 
at low rates for businesses, consumers and governments has facilitated business investment, 
consumption, property ownership and a high standard of living, as well as large and counter-
cyclical governmental expenditure, while the management of base interest rates by 
governments or central banks is a key tool of macro-economic policy. The medieval world, 
by contrast, has been seen as a period of restricted access to credit and high interest rates, 
discouraging investment and reducing the potential for economic growth, partly in response 
to the religious prohibition against usury. The idea that credit was unknown in the middle 
ages was challenged as long as ago as the 1920s by Postan and more recent work has 
presented evidence of considerable financial innovation and widespread use of credit even in 
rural areas.
2
 A better understanding about interest rates can also contribute greatly to our 
knowledge of medieval financial and economic development by facilitating the application of 
modern ideas and models. 
 Unfortunately, direct evidence about the interest rates actually charged in the middle 
ages is hard to find, as can been seen from the very short chapters on the medieval period in 
the standard history of interest rates by Homer and Sylla – which have not been updated since 
the first edition was published in 1963.
3
 This too may be a result of the usury prohibition, 
which encouraged ‘financial engineering’ to construct products that hid or disguised interest 
charges. The problem is that, by design, such charges are either invisible in the surviving 
records or difficult to convert into standardised interest rates. Even where it is possible to 
calculate interest rates for particular transactions ex post, these can vary dramatically based on 
idiosyncratic factors, such as the type of transaction, the ‘credit rating’ of the borrower or the 
condition of the money market at the time of the loan, making it hard to generalise about 
medieval interest rates.
4
   
 The best-known evidence for medieval interest rates comes from government 
borrowing, and especially the long-term public debt issued by Italian and Northern European 
city-states. Less is known about the interest rates charged on short-term loans to monarchs.
5
 
There is also some information about consumer loans from pawnshops or Jewish lenders, who 
operated under official licence and whose maximum rates were often fixed by law.
6
 While 
clearly government debt and consumer credit were important, perhaps a more significant 
question for the growth prospects of the medieval economy concerns the interest rates 
charged for commercial credit. It has been argued that the most sophisticated method used by 
merchants to disguise the charging of interest when extending credit was based on foreign 
exchange (hereafter FX) transactions and bills of exchange.
7
 While the theological basis for 
this exemption has been discussed in depth, there has been surprisingly little quantitative 
work using this source.  
                                                          
2
 Postan, ‘Credit’, pp. 234-8; Fratianni and Spinelli,’Italian city-states’; Bell et al., English Wool 
Market; Bell and Sutcliffe, ‘Valuing medieval annuities’; Briggs, Credit and Village Society. 
3
 Homer and Sylla, Interest Rates, pp. 87-109. 
4
 See the methodology developed in Bell et al., ‘Interest’, pp. 420-2. 
5
 Epstein, Freedom, pp. 16-29; Pezzolo, ‘Bonds’; Zuijverduihn, Medieval Capital Markets; Stasavage, 
States of Credit; Chilosi, ‘Risky institutions’. 
6
 De Roover, Money, Banking and Credit, p. 105. 
7
 For recent overviews from an economic history perspective, see Koyama, ‘Taint’; Rubin, ‘Bills of 
exchange’. 
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This paper will show how the relatively voluminous surviving records about exchange rates 
in the middle ages can help to illuminate the much murkier question of medieval interest 
rates. The first section sets out how the medieval FX market operated and why FX 
transactions may have been able to circumvent the letter of the usury prohibition. The second 
introduces the primary source material, a new dataset of medieval exchange rates collected 
from business letters in the archive of Francesco di Marco Datini. The third explains the 
methodology used to calculate implicit interest rates from the spread between exchange rates 
as quoted in different financial centres, adjusted for the time taken to transfer funds between 
them. The fourth section discusses the estimated interest rates and compares them against the 
evidence for the rates charged on other types of loan. Finally, the fifth section will investigate 
the level of risk involved in FX transactions and whether it was sufficient to absolve them 
from the charge of usury. 
 
I. 
The sheer scale of the modern FX market may be unprecedented, but its origins can be traced 
back at least to medieval Europe.
8
 The rise of kingdoms and principalities (many of which 
would form the basis for today’s nation-states), each asserting a monopoly on minting coins 
within its territory, combined with the ‘Commercial Revolution’ of the thirteenth century, led 
to an increase in cross-border trade and thus the need for FX. This was carried out on a local 
scale by money-changers and on an international level by (mainly Italian) merchant societies. 
The significance of FX was even recognised in medieval literature, with Chaucer writing of 
his archetypal merchant, ‘wel coude he in eschaunge sheeldes selle’.9  
 The basic principles behind the medieval exchange rate system were set out by de 
Roover in a series of seminal monographs and articles.
10
 Subsequently, Mandich made some 
important adjustments to the de Roover thesis, notably clarifying the interlinked nature of the 
market for bills of exchange, bullion and credit.
11
 The classic FX instrument was the bill of 
exchange, an informal holograph ‘order to pay’. In its fullest form, the bill stated that the 
seller (usually known as the taker or drawer) of the bill had received a sum of money in the 
local currency from the buyer (the giver or remitter) at place A. The seller then ordered his 
correspondent (the payer or drawee) in place B to pay the equivalent value in the foreign 
currency, at a specified exchange rate, to the buyer’s correspondent (the payee).  
 There was always a time lag between the issue of a bill of exchange and its 
settlement, as the bill had to be physically transported between the two financial centres. In 
general, the greater the distance between the two places, the longer the communication time. 
In addition, most exchange transactions had standardised maturities (known as the usance 
period), roughly varying with the distance. The shortest was between Florence and Pisa, 
where bills were payable three days after they were presented for payment. The longest was 
between London and the Italian cities, where bills matured three months after they were 
issued or drawn. Notably, usance was always longer than the communication time. This gave 
                                                          
8
 Einzig, History, pp. 71-4. 
9
 General prologue, line 278 (Benson, ed., Riverside Chaucer, p. 28). 
10
 See the reference list for his key works. 
11
 Mandich, ‘Ricostruzione’. The most accessible discussion incorporating de Roover and Mandich’s 
work can be found in Mueller, Venetian Money Market, pp. 293-307 
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the payer time to raise the funds after accepting the bill but it could also be used to create 
loans of varying lengths.  
 This time element meant that every bill of exchange necessarily involved the 
extension of credit.
12
 The seller of a bill of exchange was effectively a borrower, and the 
buyer a lender. In order for the bill of exchange to function effectively as a credit instrument, 
however, there needed to be some way of compensating the lender for the time value of their 
money – i.e. of paying interest. In effect, this was incorporated into the exchange rates at 
places A and B. This helps to explain one of the key features of medieval exchange rates, 
which may appear peculiar to modern eyes, namely that the same currency pair was quoted at 
different rates at each end of the transaction, with the local currency almost always valued 
more highly than the foreign. As later scholastic authors put it, 'absent money, which is worth 
less, is being bought or exchanged for present money, which is worth more'.
13
 The existence 
of this differential has been demonstrated empirically by de Roover for Barcelona and 
Bruges, Bolton and Guidi Bruscoli for Bruges and Venice, and Mueller for Venice with 
Barcelona, Bruges, Florence and London.
14
 
 Every FX transaction thus incorporated the time value of money into a premium or 
discount on the exchange rates charged. The use of bills of exchange as pure credit 
instruments required not one transaction but two. The first was the outgoing bill of exchange. 
The second was a rechange operation by which the value payable was returned back to the 
place of origin. The buyer of a bill of exchange’s profits resulted from the differential 
between the exchange rate at place A when the bill was originated and the exchange rate at 
place B when the bill was rechanged. Since this involved two exchange transactions, the term 
of the loan was equal to the sum of the usance periods from city A to city B and back from 
city B to city A.  It should be noted that, even in the case of a ‘genuine’ trade bill intended to 
transfer funds from one place to another, the buyer of the bill would still benefit by receiving 
more foreign currency in place B relative to the local currency that he had paid in place A. 
 This can be illustrated by a practical example. On 26 September 1442 in Venice, 
Francesco Venier and brothers received 150 ducats from Cosimo de’Medici and company, 
payable in London at usance (three months) at the rate of 44½ pence sterling per ducat. Both 
Venier and Cosimo shared a correspondent in London, Uberto de’Medici, and so £27 13s 3d 
sterling should have been debited from Venier’s account and credited to Cosimo’s. On 31 
December, however, Venier defaulted and so the bill was ‘protested’ and sent back to Venice. 
Importantly, this rechange bill was drawn at the exchange rate current in London, namely 
41¼ pence per ducat.
15
 Therefore, when this second bill came due in Venice circa 31 March 
1443, Venier owed Cosimo 161 ducats 16 soldi and 4 denari – an increase of 7.9%. 
Alternatively, the spread between the exchange rate in Venice and in London was 3¼ pence 
per ducat (also 7.9%). Since the two transactions took six months, this was equivalent to an 
annualised interest rate of 15.8% (non-compounded) or 16.4% (compounded). Now, it is not 
clear whether Venier was unable to honour the bill for legitimate business reasons or if 
Cosimo had agreed in advance that the bill would be protested and Venier would repay him in 
Venice. The latter would be an example of the use of FX transactions to construct a loan and 
                                                          
12
 De Roover, Rise and Decline, p. 109. 
13
 Quoted in d’Emic, Justice, p. 216. 
14
 See the graphs in de Roover, Bruges Money Market, pp. 24-5; Bolton and Guidi Bruscoli, 
‘Borromei’, pp. 472-4; Mueller, Venetian Money Market, pp. 319, 321, 328, 334-5, 603, 607-8.  
15
 Calendar of State Papers Venice, p. 568. 
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the former of a ‘genuine’ trade bill but the implicit interest rate would be the same regardless 
of the intention of the parties. 
 One factor affecting this differential between the exchange rates quoted at opposite 
ends of a currency pair was therefore the time value of money, that is, the rate of interest. 
This was not the only driver of exchange rate movements. De Roover identified four other 
factors that could influence exchange rates, namely monetary standards, the balance of trade, 
government intervention and speculation.
16
 During the period under study, there were few 
dramatic changes to monetary standards or instances of government intervention in the 
markets.
17
 Moreover, exchange rates (and so implicit interest rates) adjusted rapidly to such 
actions. The activities of speculators may have served to push the FX market back towards 
equilibrium. Perhaps the most significant of these factors was changes in the local demand for 
and supply of money in response to trade flows or economic activity – this can be seen in the 
seasonal patterns exhibited by exchange rates and, consequently, interest rates.
18
 As a result 
of these factors, the return on any individual transaction could vary depending on the 
particular circumstances of the two money markets. Conversely, this paper hypothesises that 
the average spread between the two exchange rates reflects the ‘market’ interest rate for short-
term commercial loans.  
 In its medieval form, usury did not refer solely to excessive rates of interest, but 
encompassed the exaction of anything above the principal.
19
 The conflict between this strict 
rule and economic realities led to the development of various exceptions and attempts to 
uncover ‘loopholes’. For instance, the thirteenth-century canonist Hostiensis listed thirteen 
extrinsic titles that could justify the exaction of sums above the principal lent.
20
 These 
included venditio sub dubio, for sales of goods on credit where the market price was expected 
to change, and gratis dans, a free gift from the borrower. The latter formed the basis for the 
payments made on time deposits a discrezione accepted by Italian merchant societies. At least 
legally, the payment of interest on such deposits was purely voluntary on the part of the 
borrower; in practice, however, payment was essential to maintain business confidence.
21
 
This leads to a final element of the medieval theory of usury, namely the importance of the 
intention behind the transaction. Regardless of the technical excuse used, if the creditor 
intended to receive back more than he had lent, then he was guilty of usury. Although 
intention was difficult to prove in court, it could be left to the confessional.
22
  
 With specific reference to FX transactions, a more technical argument held that 
cambium non est mutuum (an exchange is not a loan) but rather a permutatio or an emptio-
                                                          
16
 De Roover, Bruges Money Market, pp. 37-50. 
17
 For example, the dukes of Burgundy were notorious for their interference with the Flemish currency 
but the vast majority of our implicit interest rates for Bruges date from 1390 to 1410, a period of 
unusual monetary stability (ibid, pp. 39-41).. 
18
 This important question is beyond the scope of the current study but, for a preliminary investigation, 
see Bell et al, ‘Seasonality’. 
19
 The literature on the principles behind the medieval usury laws is immense and tangled. For a 
reasonable introduction, see Wood, Medieval Economic Thought, pp. 159-205. More detail about 
contemporary theological opinions can be found in Noonan, Scholastic Analysis and, with special 
reference to FX, de Roover, ‘Scholastics’. 
20
 Noonan, Scholastic Analysis, pp. 101-32. 
21
 De Roover, ‘Scholastics’, p. 262. 
22
 Noonan, Scholastic Analysis, pp. 30-6. 
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venditio since there was, in theory at least, a change of currencies involved.
23
 Of course, in 
the case of exchange and rechange, the lender was both advancing money and being repaid in 
the same currency. An alternative line of defence was that usury involved a certain gain but, 
in the transaction discussed above, the return was not fixed in advance but depended on the 
future movement of the exchange rate at the second centre. Some later scholastics likened it 
to venditio sub dubio, one of the extrinsic titles to interest.
24
 In the same way as the price of 
commodities could change over time depending on demand, the rechange rate could vary in 
response to the particular conditions of trade and the demand for money at the second centre. 
Although the existence of a spread between the exchange rates at the two financial centres 
meant that, on average and over the long run, the buyer/lender would receive a positive 
return, this could vary and, indeed, they could sometimes lose money on the transaction. 
Neither the lender nor the borrower in any specific exchange and rechange transaction could 
know the interest rate in advance and thus bills of exchange were argued not to be usurious. 
This paper will attempt to quantify the level of uncertainty involved in such transactions.  
 The use of FX transactions to conceal loans in this way was called ‘dry exchange’ 
(cambium secco) because it did not water the flows of trade. It could be carried out by 
actually sending a bill of exchange that was then ‘protested’ and returned back to the sender. 
A more efficient method was exchange cambium sine litteris or senza lettera. Here the FX 
transactions were purely book-keeping entries based on reported market rates at the second 
financial centre.
25
 This avoided the fixed costs of sending and then protesting bills of 
exchange; they can be seen as derivatives contracts on future exchange rates. Alternatively, 
there were allegations of fictitious exchanges where the exchange rates were not based on 
market rates but agreed in advance. However, by making profits certain, this would have 
fallen foul of the usury prohibition.  
Of course, although the spreads between exchange rates at different financial centres clearly 
reflected the time value of money, this did not mean that bills of exchange were only or even 
primarily used to extend credit locally. In his study of the Covoni account books, Mandich 
found numerous examples of what he termed ‘speculative exchange’.26 Here the Covoni in 
Florence bought bills of exchange on Venice without any prior agreement with the seller to 
rechange that sum in Venice. Instead, once that bill was paid in Venice, they relied on their 
broker there to find a second counterparty, one who wanted money in Venice and could draw 
on funds in Florence. In this case, there was no guarantee that they would find a matching 
counterparty. The buyers of such bills would still have benefitted from the favourable 
exchange rates but would also have played a useful economic role by acting as counterparties 
for merchants wishing to transfer funds for trading purposes.  
There is thus a debate over the extent to which bills of exchange were used as a way of 
disguising loans rather than actually transferring funds. Most historians have followed de 
Roover in asserting that bills of exchange were primarily used as credit instruments; a 
position shared by some contemporary theologians. Conversely, Leone has argued that 
speculation on exchange rates was secondary to the efficient mobilization of international 
capital while Bolton and Guidi Bruscoli found few protested bills or obvious examples of 
                                                          
23
 Wood, Medieval Economic Thought, p. 200.  
24
 Noonan, Scholastic Analysis, pp. 183-7.  
25
 For an explanation and examples, see Mueller, Venetian Money Market, pp. 318-26. 
26
 Mandich, ‘Ricostruzione’, pp. clxxx-clxxxii. 
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exchange and rechange in the account books of the Borromei at Bruges (1438) and London 
(1436-9).
27
 For our current purpose, however, the spreads between the exchange rates quoted 
in different cities can be used as an indication of market expectations about interest rates 
regardless of the intentions of the participants in particular transactions. 
 
II. 
Along with prices, there is probably more quantitative data about FX rates in the Middle Ages 
than any other economic variable. A good overview of the different currencies and rates can 
be found in Peter Spufford’s Handbook of Medieval Exchange. This includes a number of 
different types of exchange rate: official rates set by state proclamation; accounting rates used 
in internal mercantile accounts; spot rates for manual exchange of coin for coin; and in bills 
of exchange.
28
 Recent research has explored the quantitative possibilities of the surviving 
exchange rate data to investigate the integration of financial markets, arbitrage possibilities 
and seasonality and structural breaks in exchange rate time series.
29
 Here we are only 
interested in exchange rates for bills of exchange, as the other types of exchange did not 
incorporate a time element.  
 Indeed, a number of previous studies have sought to calculate interest rates from bill 
exchange rates. A key vector was between Florence and Venice, known as cambium ad 
Venetias. Mandich looked at FX transactions between Florence and Venice in the books of 
the Covoni c.1336-1340, while de Roover did the same for a number of transactions by 
Lazzaro Bracci c.1415-18.
30
 FX transactions between Venice and the key northern European 
financial centres of Bruges and London in the mid-fifteenth century are discussed by de 
Roover, based on protested bills of exchange in the Medici archives, and Mueller, from the 
account books of Andrea Barbarigo.
31
 Such studies are based on actual FX transactions 
recorded as protested bills of exchange or in merchants’ account books and so rely on a fairly 
narrow evidential base. However, as explained above, the profits from FX trading were a 
product of differential exchange rates at both ends of the exchange and rechange transaction. 
Therefore, it should be possible to reconstruct implicit or potential interest rates even where 
we do not have documentary evidence of actual exchange and rechange transactions, if we 
know the prevailing market exchange rates at both places.  
Since successful FX trading involved predicting the future movements of exchange rates, the 
merchant who had better and more up-to-date information about exchange rates in other 
banking centres enjoyed an advantage over his uninformed peers.
32
 For this reason, when 
writing to their correspondents, merchants often listed the current market exchange rates at 
the end of their commercial letters. These rates were probably collected from the bill brokers 
that arranged deals in each city.
33
 They can be seen as forerunners of the exchange rate 
currents printed from the sixteenth century onwards, which ultimately developed into the 
                                                          
27
 Leone, ‘Preliminary remarks’, pp. 626-7; Bolton and Guidi Bruscoli, ‘Borromei’, pp. 473-4. 
28
 Spufford, Handbook, pp. l-liii. 
29
 See respectively: Chilosi and Volckart, ‘Money, States and Empire’ and Kugler, ‘Financial market 
integration’; Li, ‘Bullion, bills and arbitrage’, esp. pp. 34-72; Bell et al., ‘Time series analysis’. 
30
 Mandich, ‘Ricostruzione’, pp. ccxiv-ccxix; de Roover, ‘Cambium ad Venetias’. 
31
 De Roover, Rise and Decline, pp. 116-22; Mueller, Venetian Money Market, pp. 327-32. 
32
 For the contents of these letters, see Melis, Aspetti, pp. 30-9. 
33
 De Roover, Bruges Money Market, p. 29. 
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modern financial press.
34
 Since merchants wrote frequently (on a weekly or even daily basis) 
and often had correspondents in several different financial centres, such business letters can 
provide a greater depth and wider range of data than relying on the more sporadic evidence of 
actual transactions.  
 Booth used such market exchange rates from the commercial correspondence in the 
archive of Francesco di Marco Datini to reconstruct the implied returns from FX transactions 
between Barcelona and Bruges.
35
 Datini, known as the ‘merchant of Prato’, was active as an 
international merchant and banker from c.1383 to his death in 1410.
36
 His branches (in 
capitals) and major correspondents are shown in figure 1. Although his main business 
interests concentrated on the western Mediterranean, with an arc of branches stretching from 
Tuscany, Southern France and Spain, he was in touch with correspondents in Northern 
Europe (Bruges, London and Paris) and Northern and Eastern Italy (Milan, Venice). Datini is 
still known today because of the survival of many of his business records, including 600 
account books and 150,000 items of correspondence.
37
 These provide an unparalleled source 
for medieval economic and financial history. 
 The current paper draws on a greatly expanded dataset of exchange rates compiled 
from the Datini archive. We build on the existing material collected by de Roover for 
Barcelona and Bruges and Mueller for Venice. The bulk of our observations, however, were 
hand-collected from the original letters from Florence, Genoa, London, and Paris.
38
 Summary 
data for the relevant exchange rates is shown in table 1. This exchange rate data is then used 
to calculate implicit interest rates based on the spread between the exchange rates quoted at 
the two ends of a notional exchange and rechange transaction. Using this data and 
methodology, we can compare interest rates in seven European financial centres over a nearly 
thirty-year period between 1383 and 1411, broadening as well as deepening our 
understanding of medieval interest rates. 
 These medieval business letters are not easy sources to use. Just like FX traders 
today, the medieval merchants developed their own conventions and terminology to describe 
the exchange rates. In order to interpret them correctly, it is vital to understand the different 
ways in which exchange rates were quoted.
39
 There were two main methods of quotation. In 
the first, rates were quoted as ‘uncertain for certain’, that is as a variable number of units of 
currency A per fixed unit of currency B. In the second, rates were quoted as a percentage 
better or worse than par, reflecting the fact that most gold coins were based on a common 
model, either the florin of Florence or the ducat of Venice, and so had a similar intrinsic 
metallic content. Some rates, notably those for Bruges, were quoted in both ways at different 
places and times.  
                                                          
34
 McCusker and Gravesteijn, Beginnings. 
35
 Booth, ‘Foreign exchange profits’. 
36
 The indispensable guide is still Melis, Aspetti. See also Origo, Merchant of Prato and the essays in 
Nigro, ed., Francesco di Marco Datini. 
37
 Images of Datini’s correspondence can be viewed online at http://datini.archiviodistato.prato.it/.  
38
 The exchange rates given in the appendix to de Roover, Bruges Money Market, were rekeyed into 
our dataset. We extended the Bruges series by including letters sent to Florence and Genoa. Mueller’s 
exchange rates for Venice are available in electronic form at the Medieval and Early Modern Data 
Bank (http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/memdb/) but note that there are errors in the series for Barcelona.  
39
 The following is based on three near-contemporary merchant manuals, attributed to Ricci c.1396 
(Borlandi, ed., Manuale Mercantura), Uzzano c.1442 (Pagnini, ed., Della Decima, IV) and Chiarini 
c.1458 (Borlandi, ed., Libro di Mercatantie).  
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Figure 1: Map of Datini’s branches and key correspondents 
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Table 1: Selected exchange rate series from the Datini archive 
 
PlaceFrom PlaceTo DateRange 
Start 
DateRange 
End 
Daily 
Obs 
Method of quotation 
Barcelona Bruges 28/02/1383 03/09/1411 683 Pence of Barcelona per écu of 22 
groats 
Florence 19/06/1389 03/09/1411 373 Pence of Barcelona per florin di 
suggello 
Genoa 28/02/1383 03/09/1411 721 Pence of Barcelona per florin of 
25 solidi 
Venice 17/03/1398 03/09/1411 337 Pence of Barcelona per ducat 
Bruges Barcelona 29/08/1384 08/06/1411 807 Pence of Barcelona per écu of 22 
groats 
Genoa 29/08/1384 08/06/1411 820 Groats per florin of 25 soldi 
London 15/07/1388 08/06/1411 757 Pence sterling per écu of 24 groats 
Paris 29/08/1384 08/06/1411 806 Groats per franc 
Venice 29/08/1384 08/06/1411 825 Groats per ducat 
Florence Barcelona 05/02/1383 03/08/1411 1293 Pence of Barcelona per florin 
Genoa 29/01/1383 15/09/1410 2580 Par between florin di suggello and 
florin of 25 soldi 
Venice 29/01/1383 03/08/1411 2415 Pence affiorino per lira di grossi 
of 10 ducats 
Genoa Barcelona 02/08/1382 11/08/1410 2581 Pence of Barcelona per florin of 
25 soldi 
Bruges 21/04/1381 11/08/1410 2131 Groats per florin of 25 soldi 
Florence 07/08/1379 11/08/1410 3355 Par between florin of 25 soldi and 
florin di suggello 
London 23/10/1391 11/08/1410 1343 Pence sterling per florin of 25 
soldi 
Paris 02/08/1382 11/08/1410 1854 Par between florin of 25 soldi and 
franc 
Venice 23/10/1379 11/08/1410 2234 Par between florin of 25 soldi and 
ducat 
London Bruges 20/07/1388 03/08/1411 192 Pence sterling per écu of 24 groats 
Genoa 06/01/1392 03/08/1411 186 Pence sterling per florin of 25 
soldi 
Paris Bruges 02/06/1384 05/05/1410 613 Groats per franc  
Genoa 02/06/1384 05/05/1410 617 Par between franc and florin of 25 
soldi 
Venice 12/06/1384 05/05/1410 524 Par between franc and ducat 
Venice Barcelona 27/02/1399 20/02/1411 473 Pence of Barcelona per ducat 
Bruges 13/02/1384 20/02/1411 787 Grossi of Venice per franc of 33 
groats 
Florence 07/11/1383 20/02/1411 1224 Pence affiorino per lira di grossi 
of 10 ducats 
Genoa 26/11/1383 04/10/1410 1031 Par between ducat and florin of 25 
soldi 
Paris 28/07/1388 20/02/1411 592 Grossi of Venice per franc 
Source: Exchange Rates Dataset 
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 For example, the exchange rate between Florence and Venice was quoted in terms of 
an uncertain number of lira, soldi and denari affiorino (for convoluted historical reasons, 29 
soldi affiorino – and thus 348 denari – were equivalent to one Florentine florin) per one lira 
di grossi (equivalent to 10 Venetian ducats). During the period of the Datini letters – c.1380-
1411 – the exchange rate moved between about 14 lira 10 soldi affiorino and 15 lira 16 soldi 
affiorino or 3,480 denari to 3,792 denari affiorino. Day to day rates could be quoted down to 
a single denaro affiorino, although they generally moved in increments of two, four or six 
denari.
40
 This is an extraordinarily precise method of quoting exchange rates, equivalent to 
between five and seventeen basis points. Exchange rates with Barcelona were always quoted 
in terms of solidi and denari of Barcelona per unit of foreign currency and with London as a 
variable number of pence sterling per unit of foreign currency. As de Roover pointed out 
(repeatedly), the logic of the time value of money meant that the exchange rate at the place 
that gave certain should generally be higher than the rate at the place that gave uncertain.  
The second method quoted rates as a percentage better (meglio) or worse (pegio) than par. If, 
for example, the rate at Florence for the Genoese florin was at par, then the buyer of a bill of 
exchange for 100 Florentine florins in Florence would receive 100 Genoese florins in Genoa. 
If the rate was five better, then the same 100 Florentine florins would be worth 105 Genoese. 
However, if it was five worse, then the buyer would have to pay 105 Florentine florins to 
receive 100 Genoese – not that 100 Florentine florins would equal 95 Genoese.41 In effect, the 
weaker currency gave uncertain to the stronger currency. This method of quotation seems 
counter-intuitive but in fact it had a significant practical benefit. If the rate at Florence was 
five worse and that at Genoa was six better, then the merchant could quickly calculate the 
spread between the two rates by adding them together and dividing by the weaker rate, in the 
same way as above. In this case, the spread would have been 0.95%. However, it raises 
difficulties where the exchange rates fluctuate around par and thus frequently cross over from 
meglio to pegio. For this reason, in our dataset we converted all par rates to an uncertain 
number of units of foreign currency per 100 units of local currency. 
 The next variable to consider is the usance period between any two financial centres, 
as shown in table 2. There were two distinct methods of specifying when a bill of exchange 
would mature. In the first, and simplest, the bill of exchange came due a set number of days 
after it was drawn. In the second, the bill was payable a set number of days after sight, i.e. 
after it was presented to the payer by the payee. This introduces a degree of unpredictability 
since the travel time between centres could vary. For example, Melis found that the average 
postal time between Bruges and Barcelona was 23 days, but the journey could be as short as 
11 or as long as 48 days.
42
 As usance between the two cities was 30 days after sight, the 
length of any individual transfer could vary from 41 to 78 days, assuming that the bill was 
presented immediately upon arrival. In fact, many of the actual bills of exchange from Bruges 
to Barcelona surviving in the Datini archive record the date on which the bill was issued in 
 
                                                          
40
 This exchange rate was sometimes quoted as a percentage better or worse than par, where par was 
taken as ten lira affiorino (3,480d) to one lira di grossi. 
41
 Mueller, Venetian Money Market, pp. 589-90 unfortunately confuses this point. For the correct 
interpretation, see Heers, Gênes, p. 78.  
42
 Melis, ‘Intensità’, pp. 197, 203. 
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Table 2: Usance periods 
 Barcelona Bruges Florence Genoa London Paris Venice 
Barcelona  S+30(60) D60 S+20(40) N/A S+30(50) D60 
Bruges S+30(60)  N/A D60 D30 D30 D60 
Florence D60 D60  S+8(14) D90 D60 S+5(10) 
Genoa S+20(40) S+10(34) S+8(14)  D90 S+10(28) S+15(25) 
London N/A D30 N/A D90  N/A D90 
Paris S+30(50) S+10(14) D60 D60 D30  D60 
Venice 60 D60 D20 S+15(25) D90 D60  
Source: Borlandi, ed., Manuale di Mercantura; Pagnini, ed., Della Decima, IV; Borlandi, ed., 
Libro di Mercatantie. Notes: D indicates date from drawing of the bill while S indicates days 
after sight (presentation of the bill). In the latter case, the number in brackets shows the 
average usance period taking into account the mean postal time (Melis, ‘Intensità’). 
 
Bruges and subsequently accepted by the payer in Barcelona.
43
 From this, it appears that bills 
were presented on average 28 days after drawing. Moreover, a smaller number of bills fixed 
the usance period at 60 days from drawing. As a result, we have used 60 days as our standard 
duration for an FX transaction between Barcelona and Bruges, rather than the 53 days 
assumed by Booth.
44
 
 An interesting feature is the asymmetry in usance periods between certain centres 
depending on the direction of the transaction. For example, usance from Florence to Venice 
was five days after sight and, since the usual travel time between the two cities was five or six 
days, the standard usance period was 10 or 11 days.
45
 By contrast, usance from Venice to 
Florence was 20 days after drawing. In both directions, a complete exchange and rechange 
transaction would take thirty days but, from Florence, the rechange rate (and thus the implicit 
interest rate) would be fixed after 10 days while, from Venice, it would be fixed after 20 days. 
This affected the riskiness of the two transactions as the lender in Florence only had to predict 
the Venetian exchange rate 10 days ahead, while his counterpart in Venice had to wait twice 
as long. Clearly, the FX system was established by Florentine merchants for their own 
benefit.
46
 Similarly, usance from Genoa to Paris and Bruges was ten days after sight (plus 
average postal times of 18 and 24 days respectively) while that from both Bruges and Paris to 
Genoa was 60 days from drawing. Usance seems to have been ten days from sight from Paris 
to Bruges but one month from drawing from Bruges to Paris.
47
 
                                                          
43
 Since Datini had no branch in Bruges, we lack any bills sent from Barcelona to Bruges. 
44
 Booth, ‘Foreign exchange profits’, pp. 133-5. We repeated our calculations using a usance period of 
53 days; the spreads do not change appreciably (changing from 4.40% to 4.35% for Barcelona-Bruges 
and 4.50% to 4.48% for Bruges-Barcelona) but the annualised implicit interest rates increase in 
proportion to the reduction in the term (from 14.42% and 14.67% to 16.23% and 16.67% respectively). 
45
 We take ten days – using the evidence of the exchange and rechange transactions identified by 
Mandich, ‘Ricostruzione’, from the Covoni account books. 
46
 Mueller, Venetian Money Market, p.296 and n.10. 
47
 There is conflicting evidence about the usance periods between Bruges and Paris. Ricci gives usance 
from Paris to Bruges as twelve days from sight (plus postal time of four days) but Bruges to Paris as 
one month from drawing. This broadly agrees with the manual attributed to Chiarini, which states that 
usance from Paris to Bruges was ten days from sight and Bruges to Paris was one month from drawing. 
According to Uzzano, however, usance was ten days from sight in both directions. The time taken for a 
complete change and rechange transaction could therefore be 28 or 44/46 days. We take 46 days as the 
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 The fact that there was a considerable variety in usance periods between different 
financial centres potentially allowed for the construction of loans of differing maturities. 
Exchange and rechange between two close centres, for example Florence and Venice or 
Florence and Genoa, produced a loan of roughly one month’s duration. A longer term loan of 
four months could be engineered by engaging in an exchange and rechange transaction 
between Italy and Spain or Northern Europe and Spain. The longest loans, of six months, 
were between Genoa (later Venice) and London. Loans could also be extended by 
immediately entering into another exchange and rechange transaction; one borrower remained 
on the exchange for nearly two years.
48
 Obviously, the length of the usance periods in both 
directions needs to be taken into account when converting the spreads between the two 
exchange rates into an annualised interest rate.  
 
III. 
Our methodology draws on the basic principles set out by de Roover and Booth’s idea of 
using market exchange rates but, instead of looking at just one currency pair, we calculate 
interest rates for all currency pairs where we have sufficient information in our dataset of 
exchange rates collected from the Datini archive. This involves a three stage process. First, 
we identify matching sets of exchange rate observations for each of our currency pairs. 
Second, we calculate the spread between these two rates, and third, we convert this spread to 
an annualized interest rate taking into account the usance period. To illustrate the 
methodology in more detail, we will take the exchange between Florence and Venice 
(cambium ad Venetias) as an exemplar.  
 Our dataset contains 2,415 daily observations of the exchange rate between the 
Florentine florin and the Venetian ducat at Florence and 1,224 daily observations at Venice. 
First, we identify all cases where we have an observation at Florence and a corresponding 
observation at Venice lagged by the usance period, and vice versa. Since usance from 
Florence to Venice was ten days, we identify all potential matches where datet of an exchange 
rate observation in Florence equals datet+10 for an exchange rate observation in Venice. This 
produces 275 matching sets of observations. Now, the usance of bills from Venice to 
Florence was twenty days after drawing; identifying all matches where datet of an observation 
in Venice corresponds to an observation with datet+20 in Florence returns 256 matches.  
 To enlarge the dataset, where there were no exact matches, we extended the search to 
include the closest match within one day before or after the exact target date. If we find a 
matching entry one day before and one day after the target date, we take the average of the 
two observations. This increases the number of observations to 832 and 769 respectively. 
Further expanding the parameters to include the closest date within two days of the target 
returns 1,276 and 947 matches. Given the relatively short usance periods between these two 
cities, it is not appropriate (or even necessary, given the amount of data from these two places 
and thus the number of matches returned by even restrictive assumptions) to extend the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Ricci manual is closest to our period but we repeated our calculations using the alternative usance 
period of 14 days in each direction. As in the case of Barcelona and Bruges (above, n. 43), the spreads 
remain similar but the annualised rates increase in line with the fall in the term. 
48
 Mueller, Venetian Money Market, pp. 290-1 n.4. 
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parameters further. For some of the more distant centres with longer usance periods or less 
surviving data, however, we search for matches within up to seven days of the target date.
49
  
 Second, we calculate the spread between these two rates, Sp. When exchange rates 
are quoted using the ‘certain’/’uncertain’ method, as in this case, the spread is calculated by 
deducting the rate at the place that gave uncertain, ER
UC
 (i.e. Florence) from that at the place 
that gave certain, ER
C
 (Venice). This nominal spread can then be converted into a percentage 
value by dividing it by the rate at the place that gave uncertain. Note that this basic principle 
applies regardless of the direction of the transaction.
50
 This is shown in equation (1). 
 
𝑆𝑝 =
𝐸𝑅𝑐− 𝐸𝑅𝑢𝑐
𝐸𝑅𝑢𝑐
         (1) 
 
 Where the exchange rates are quoted as a percentage better or worse than par, the 
method is slightly different. As explained above, our dataset converted all of these rates into 
the amount of foreign currency received per 100 units of local currency. In effect, both places 
give certain. The exchange rate at A thus represents the value received at place B in return for 
100 units of currency A. This is then multiplied by the rechange rate (the exchange rate at B) 
to calculate the sum received back at place A. Deducting the original 100 units that we started 
with at A produces the nominal spread, and this can be converted into percentage format by 
dividing by 100. This is shown in equation (2). 
 
𝑆𝑝 =
(𝐸𝑅𝐴∗ 
𝐸𝑅𝐵
100
)−100
100
        (2) 
 
 For purposes of comparison, we convert the percentage spread between the two rates 
– which represents the return from any one exchange and rechange transaction – into an 
annualized rate, taking into account the usance periods. In this case, even though usance from 
Florence to Venice differed from that from Venice to Florence, the overall time taken for a 
complete exchange and rechange operation was the same in both cases, namely 30 days or 
                                                          
49
 We also conduct a further robustness check. In many cases, the number of daily observations at one 
centre is much greater than at the other. Continuing the above example, we have twice as many 
observations at Florence than at Venice. The search parameter will sometimes match multiple 
Florentine observations with the same observation at Venice. For instance, we have an observation on 
27 January 1385 at Florence, with matches exactly with an observation on 6 February at Venice. 
However, running the search with the expanded parameters would also identify that same observation 
at Venice as the closest match for Florentine observations on 26 January (within one day), 24 January 
(three days) and 23 January (four days). To test whether this has an impact on the average and 
distribution of the implicit interest rates, we also construct a second set of calculations for Florence, but 
this time matching an observation at Venice at datet with one at Florence at datet-10. These results are 
shown in table 3 in brackets and do not differ markedly from those using the first method. 
50
 In his calculations for exchange and rechange from Bruges to Venice, de Roover (Rise and Decline, 
p. 120) divides by the rate at Venice as the place of rechange rather than by the rate at Bruges as the 
place that gave uncertain. As a result, he understates the interest rates by an average of 1.58%. 
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roughly one month. We calculate both a simple annualized interest rate using equation (3) and 
a compounded annualized interest rate using equation (4). 
 
𝐼𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 = 𝑆𝑝 ∗ (
365
𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐴𝐵+𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐵𝐴
)       (3) 
 
𝐼𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 = (1 + 𝑆𝑝) ^ (
365
𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐴𝐵+𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐵𝐴
) − 1     (4) 
 
 Summary details for cambium ad Venetias are shown in table 3. The average spread 
at Florence was between 0.80% and 0.84%, depending on the match parameters, while in 
Venice it was between 0.79% and 0.82%. When these are converted into annualized rates, 
those for Florence range from 9.76% to 10.22% (simple) and 10.59% to 11.15% 
(compounded), and those for Venice from 9.73% to 10.00% (simple) and 10.89% to 11.3% 
(compounded). Both the spreads and the annualized interest rates are very similar whether the 
FX transaction originated in Florence or in Venice. However, the distribution of these returns 
differs in significant ways. This can be seen visually in figure 2 or in the standard deviations 
reported in table 3. There is a markedly greater variation in the implied interest rates at 
Venice as compared to Florence – the standard deviation for transactions originated in Venice 
is 50% higher than for those in Florence. This presumably reflects the fact that the return rate 
(and hence the spread) was fixed after 20 days in bills of exchange from Venice but after only 
10 days in those from Florence. It may be another indication that the Florentine cambistas 
established this system in their own interests. We will return to the question of the risk 
involved in exchange and rechange transactions, and whether this was sufficient to avoid the 
charge of usury in section V. 
Table 3: Cambium ad Venetias example 
Place of 
transaction 
Florence Venice 
Match parameters 
(days) 
0 1 2 0 1 2 
Observations 
275 
(232) 
832 
(612) 
1276 
(781) 
256 769 947 
Mean spread 
0.80% 
(0.80%) 
0.82% 
(0.84%) 
0.84% 
(0.84%) 
0.80% 0.79% 0.82% 
Simple annualized 
interest rate 
9.76% 
(9.76%) 
10.03% 
(10.23%) 
10.22% 
(10.24%) 
9.73% 9.62% 10.0% 
Compounded 
annualized 
interest rate 
10.59% 
(10.21%) 
10.91% 
(11.16%) 
11.15% 
(11.20%) 
10.97% 10.89% 11.30% 
Standard 
deviation of the 
spread 
0.71% 
(0.71%) 
0.74% 
(0.76%) 
0.77% 
(0.78%) 
1.02% 1.05% 1.05% 
Source: Exchange Rate Dataset. Note: the figures in brackets after the Florentine results are 
based on the alternative method of matching observations set out above.
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Figure 2: Distribution of returns from cambium ad Venetias 
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 The same methodology was then applied to our other exchange rate series. Although 
our exchange rate database contains a total of 88 currency pairs from 10 different cities, it 
was not feasible to calculate interest rates for all of these. The first requirement is that we 
have exchange rate observations from the two centres at each end of the currency pair. For 
example, Florence quoted Bruges, London and Paris but none of those three places quoted 
rates for Florence and therefore it is not possible to calculate interest rates between those 
three cities and Florence using the exchange and rechange method. The second is that we 
have a sufficient number of observations to find a reasonable number of matching sets. As a 
result, our dataset has been reduced to 14 currency pairs from seven different financial centres 
(and thus 28 sets of implicit interest rates). The results for all our locations and currency pairs 
are shown in table 4. We only report one set of matching criteria for each pair, seeking to 
maximize the number of matches while minimizing the range of the search parameters. Even 
so, our calculations are based on several hundred matching observations for each pair whereas 
the previous studies cited above have relied on dozens. 
Table 4: Implicit interest rates from the Datini archive, 1380-1411 
CityFrom CityTo Term Match Number Spread Simple APR Compounded APR 
Barcelona Bruges 120 4 337 4.40% 13.39% 14.42% 
Barcelona Florence 120 3 278 3.93% 11.97% 12.73% 
Barcelona Genoa 80 2 560 3.33% 15.18% 16.79% 
Barcelona Venice 120 3 245 4.43% 13.47% 14.31% 
Bruges Barcelona 120 4 459 4.50% 13.70% 14.67% 
Bruges Genoa 94 1 466 3.73% 14.49% 15.93% 
Bruges London 60 4 179 2.24% 13.66% 15.20% 
Bruges Paris 46 1 194 1.33% 11.55% 11.53% 
Bruges Venice 120 3 500 3.68% 11.18% 11.82% 
Florence Barcelona 120 3 393 3.85% 11.70% 12.37% 
Florence Genoa 28 0 880 0.83% 10.83% 12.10% 
Florence Venice 30 1 832 0.82% 10.03% 10.91% 
Genoa Barcelona 80 2 543 3.48% 15.89% 17.59% 
Genoa Bruges 94 1 558 3.52% 13.67% 14.67% 
Genoa Florence 28 0 880 0.84% 10.92% 12.17% 
Genoa London 180 4 356 6.85% 13.89% 14.54% 
Genoa Paris 88 2 510 3.81% 15.82% 17.05% 
Genoa Venice 50 0 269 1.45% 10.56% 11.44% 
London Bruges 60 4 127 2.11% 12.82% 14.30% 
London Genoa 180 4 166 6.67% 13.52% 14.20% 
Paris Bruges 46 1 190 1.15% 9.09% 9.72% 
Paris Genoa 88 2 446 3.39% 14.07% 15.37% 
Paris Venice 120 3 288 4.26% 12.96% 13.77% 
Venice Barcelona 120 3 243 4.28% 13.01% 13.81% 
Venice Bruges 120 3 375 3.38% 10.27% 10.85% 
Venice Florence 30 1 769 0.79% 9.62% 10.89% 
Venice Genoa 50 0 258 1.32% 9.62% 10.78% 
Venice Paris 120 3 248 4.14% 12.58% 13.34% 
Source: Exchange Rate Dataset.  
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IV. 
At first glance, the spreads between the currency pairs seem to differ widely, from around 
0.8% between Florence, Genoa and Venice all the way up to nearly 7% from Genoa to 
London. However, once these are annualized taking into account the different usance periods, 
as explained above, they fall into a much more consistent band ranging between 10% and 
16%. The consistency of these results between the different currency pairs and financial 
centres is striking and confirms that the time value of money was indeed incorporated into the 
spread between exchange rates at different centres in a systematic way.  
 Moreover, the implicit interest rates calculated from exchange rates are economically 
reasonable and broadly comparable with other indications of the cost of commercial credit at 
this time. The interest rates paid by merchant companies on time deposits a discrezione at 
Florence varied between 6% and 10% during the later middle ages.
51
 Loans to private 
individuals were more expensive; in fifteenth-century Florence, Guiliano de’Medici charged 
10-12% per annum on six month business loans that were mostly fully-collateralised either by 
shares in the public debt or by third-party guarantors.
52
 We have seen that cambium ad 
Venetias returned around 11% compounded per annum. Rates outside Italy may have been 
slightly higher, with Heers finding that Genoese merchants in London charged 14-15% per 
annum for straight loans and 15.5% to 18% on sales credits extended.
53
 This compares to the 
implicit interest rates of 14.2% and 14.3% (compounded) per annum calculated from the 
spreads between the exchange rates in London and Bruges, and in London and Genoa 
respectively. 
 A more spiritually-sound use of capital was partnership investments in which the 
investor shared in the profits and the risks. In total, Datini invested around 26,000 florins in 
his six merchant banking companies and Melis has painstakingly reconstructed his returns on 
these investments. Overall, average returns on equity were consistent at 15-16% per annum, 
with the Genoese company slightly underperforming at 12.34%.
54
 Such equity investments 
were not risk-free and the year-to-year returns could fluctuate significantly; the Catalan 
companies posted average annual returns of nearly 40% between 1396 and 1403, peaking at 
45.31% in 1398-9, but falling to under 10% per annum after 1403.
55
 These figures may also 
overestimate the ex ante expected returns, since there is a significant survivorship bias as 
none of Datini’s businesses failed and exposed him to significant capital losses. Still, the 
return from such investments was at least comparable to, and possibly slightly greater than, 
the implicit interest rates from exchange and rechange transactions. As a result, when Datini 
decided to invest 4,000 florins to establish a local banking company in Florence in 1398, one 
of his factors wrote to express his surprise, as ‘most moneychangers tend to take up 
commerce and leave moneychanging, since they make more profit and also because it is more 
just in the eyes of God’.56  
 Of course, part of the profit generated by such companies would have come from 
their activities in the FX market, whether as genuine trade finance or ‘dry exchange’. In terms 
                                                          
51
 Goldthwaite, ‘Local banking’, pp. 32-4. 
52
 Edler de Roover, ‘Restitution’, pp. 778-85. 
53
 Heers, ‘Les Génois’, pp. 816-18. 
54
 Melis, Aspetti, p. 322. 
55
 Melis, Aspetti, p. 271. 
56
 Goldthwaite, Economy, p. 413. 
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of direct industrial investment, between 1398 and 1406, the Strozzi wool company produced a 
return on equity of 17.6%.
57
 Datini may have been less fortunate in his investments; although 
the veil manufacturing business he established with Domenico di Cambio returned 16.86% on 
his equity, his wool and dyeing businesses in Prato only made him 4-7%.
58
 Implied interest 
rates have also been estimated from grain storage costs – estimated at between 12% and 20% 
- and wool forward contracts – equivalent to 17%-22% per annum.59  
 On the other hand, lending via bills of exchange or promised a higher return than 
investing in the monti of the Italian city-states. There is some controversy over how best to 
interpret the interest rates paid on this debt. The figures compiled by Epstein and used by 
Stasavage are based on the nominal coupons paid on the par value of the shares when issued. 
Between 1376 and 1425, shares in the Genoese public debt paid a coupon of 7-8%, those of 
Venice around 4%, and Florence between 3.75% and 5%. However, the limited data from the 
secondary market for such shares suggests that they subsequently traded at a considerable 
discount. During the period under study, the market price of Florentine debt fluctuated 
between 15% and 60% of par and that of Venice between 20% and 60%.
60
 As Chilosi has 
pointed out, using market yields rather than the par value of the coupon would almost double 
the actual interest rates charged to the city-states.
61
 It should also be noted that such 
investments were far from risk-free, given the frequent suspensions of interest payments. An 
alternative was to invest in urban or rural property but such long-term and secured investment 
is not strictly comparable to the extension of short-term and unsecured commercial credit. 
Clark calculates the annual return on land in Italy between 1350 and 1450 at 8.1% to 9.6%. 
This seems high; the Florentine Catasto of 1427 capitalised rental income at 7% and Pezzolo 
argues that income from land did not generally exceed 5% per annum.
62
  
 To summarise, the returns from engaging in exchange and rechange transactions were 
higher than investing in ‘safe’ assets such as landed property or shares in the debt of Italian 
city-states, and comparable to or only slightly lower than equity investment in trading and 
industrial ventures. This seems to be in line with the risk involved in these different 
investments. As a result, it seems that Domenico di Cambio, Datini’s partner at Florence, may 
have slightly over-estimated the profitability of such FX transactions compared to other 
activities when he asserted that ‘I would rather earn 12% with our merchandise than 18% on 
exchange dealings’.63  However, here Domenico was primarily asserting a moral position 
based on the association of some types of FX transactions with usury. 
 
V. 
A major strand in the historiography of medieval finance has argued that the bill of exchange 
was frequently or even primarily used to circumvent the church prohibition on charging 
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 Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, pp. 39-42. 
58
 Melis, Aspetti, p. 322. 
59
 Brunt and Cannon, ‘Grain of truth’; McCloskey and Nash, ‘Corn at interest’, pp. 178-85; Bell at al. 
English Wool Market, pp. 139-43. 
60
 Epstein, Freedom, pp. 18-19 n. 18; Stasavage, States of Credit, p. 38; Pezzolo, ‘Bonds’, pp. 154, 157.  
61
 Chilosi, ‘Risky institutions’, pp. 890-2. 
62
 Clark, ‘Cost of capital, pp. 274-5; Goldthwaite, Economy, p. 566; Pezzolo, ‘Bonds’, p. 160. For the 
low rates of return on land, see also Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, pp. 246-50. 
63
 Origo, Merchant of Prato, p. 147. 
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interest, in part because there was no fixed or certain profit. Our results show that, although 
the average interest rates were consistent across the different exchange rate pairs, there was 
still a very considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the returns from any particular 
exchange and rechange transaction. Just as today, investing in the FX market could be risky. 
Some indications of the risk involved in such transactions are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5: Risk and return 
City 
From 
City To Negative 
return 
Spread APR compounded Sharpe 
ratio 
Mean STDEV Mean STDEV 
Barcelona Bruges 5.64% 4.40% 3.52% 14.42% 7.16% 0.896 
Barcelona Florence 6.12% 3.93% 2.90% 12.73% 5.60% 0.844 
Barcelona Genoa 9.46% 3.33% 2.77% 16.79% 6.75% 1.301 
Barcelona Venice 2.45% 4.43% 2.60% 14.31% 4.97% 1.268 
Bruges Barcelona 6.10% 4.50% 3.21% 14.67% 6.22% 1.073 
Bruges Genoa 10.09% 3.73% 3.26% 15.93% 7.36% 1.077 
Bruges London 8.94% 2.24% 2.06% 15.20% 6.04% 1.191 
Bruges Paris 13.9% 1.33% 1.27% 11.53% 3.96% 0.893 
Bruges Venice 8.00% 3.68% 2.60% 11.82% 4.91% 0.779 
Florence Barcelona 4.58% 3.85% 2.52% 12.37% 4.83% 0.905 
Florence Genoa 10.80% 0.83% 0.89% 12.10% 3.88% 1.056 
Florence Venice 9.74% 0.82% 0.74% 10.91% 2.92% 0.998 
Genoa Barcelona 7.55% 3.48% 2.76% 17.59% 7.03% 1.364 
Genoa Bruges 1.97% 3.52% 2.20% 14.67% 4.93% 1.353 
Genoa Florence 10.57% 0.84% 0.88% 12.17% 3.67% 1.135 
Genoa London 4.49% 6.85% 3.87% 14.54% 5.87% 1.114 
Genoa Paris 0.78% 3.81% 1.89% 17.05% 4.39% 2.060 
Genoa Venice 8.55% 1.45% 1.24% 11.44% 3.71% 0.926 
London Bruges 8.66% 2.11% 2.11% 14.30% 6.14% 1.027 
London Genoa 1.20% 6.67% 4.46% 14.20% 6.87% 0.901 
Paris Bruges 7.89% 1.15% 0.93% 9.72% 2.92% 0.588 
Paris Genoa 7.40% 3.39% 2.72% 15.37% 6.39% 1.152 
Paris Venice 3.47% 4.26% 2.70% 13.77% 5.25% 1.100 
Venice Barcelona 2.06% 4.28% 2.67% 13.81% 5.11% 1.138 
Venice Bruges 8.80% 3.38% 2.62% 10.85% 4.92% 0.578 
Venice Florence 18.47% 0.79% 1.05% 10.89% 4.21% 0.687 
Venice Genoa 18.99% 1.32% 1.72% 10.78% 5.35% 0.520 
Venice Paris 3.63% 4.14% 2.61% 13.34% 4.99% 1.070 
Source: Exchange Rate Dataset. 
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 First of all, it was certainly possible for the lender to lose money on an exchange and 
rechange transaction. In the case of cambium ad Venetias examined above, some 9.4% of the 
transactions originating at Florence (81 of 832) and 18.5% of those at Venice (142 of 769) 
would have produced a negative return. This discrepancy partly reflects the shorter usance 
from Florence to Venice as opposed to Venice to Florence. On the other hand, only 1.20% of 
the exchange and rechange transactions from London to Genoa resulted in a negative return. 
This was an inevitable consequence of the way that the system operated. Because the 
combined usance period between Florence and Venice was only 30 days, the spread required 
to produce a reasonable interest rate was less than one per cent. Thus relatively small 
movements in the rates at Florence and Venice could wipe out this spread. As an exchange 
and rechange transaction between Genoa and London took six times as long, the spread was 
roughly six times the size and it was much less likely that the fluctuations in exchange rates 
would exceed this. 
 Another way of measuring risk is to examine the standard deviation of the returns 
rather than just the mean. Table 5 first shows the standard deviations in the spreads between 
the rates. This seems to throw up some odd results as the short-term return between Genoa 
and Florence was more volatile (mean of 0.84% and a standard deviation of 0.88%) than the 
long-term return between Genoa and London (6.82% and 3.56% respectively). However, this 
does not take into account the frequency of transactions. A merchant could carry out six 
exchange and rechange operations between Genoa and Florence in the same time as one 
between Genoa and London. The annual return from trading Florence-Genoa would be the 
product of twelve separate transactions, rather than two in the case of Genoa-London. A 
greater number of operations per year is statistically likely to smooth out the standard 
deviation of the expected annual return. 
 Thus we calculate adjusted standard deviations taking into account the number of 
operations possible in each year. We treat the sample as a population, which we are 
effectively drawing from. Supposing that there are 100 observations which have a mean of x 
and a variance of y. We treat this as the population and then standard sampling theory applies 
so if a set of N observations is drawn from the population, it will be normally distributed with 
the same mean (x) and a variance of y/N, and the standard deviation of the sample will be the 
square root of (y/N), where N is the number drawn from the "population" (not how many 
observations there were originally). 
 These adjusted standard deviations are also shown in table 5. Returning to the above 
example of Genoa-Florence and Genoa-London, for the former, the unadjusted standard 
deviation of the compounded annual returns is 13.27% but, taking into account the number of 
transactions, the adjusted standard deviation falls to 3.67%. This can then be compared to the 
mean compounded annual value of 12.14%. For the latter, the adjustment to the standard 
deviation is naturally smaller, from 8.25% to 5.80%, compared to the mean of 13.89%. This 
adjustment seems to resolve the counter-intuitive finding that returns on short-term credit 
were more volatile and risky than those on longer-term credit arrangements. It also highlights 
further examples of differences depending on the direction of the transaction. For instance, 
the adjusted standard deviation of returns from Florence to Venice is 2.89% (the lowest of 
any, commensurate with the idea that this was the most developed market) but from Venice to 
Florence it is 4.21%. A similar situation applies to Genoa and Bruges/Paris, and Paris-Bruges, 
reflecting the asymmetry in the usance periods. 
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 We can now use the adjusted standard deviations to assess the risk-adjusted returns of 
exchange and rechange transactions for different currency pairs and directions. A standard 
method to assess risk-weighted returns is the Sharpe ratio.
64
 This measures the excess return 
(or risk premium) per unit of deviation produced by an investment asset or a trading strategy. 
The Sharpe ratio is calculated by deducting a benchmark rate from the mean return, and then 
dividing by the standard deviation. A higher Sharpe ratio promises better return for the same 
risk or, viewed from the opposite perspective, the same return for lower risk. We use a figure 
of 8% as a reasonable return for a term deposit a discrezione with a merchant society, which 
is the most natural alternative form of short-term credit to the use of bills of exchange.  
 The risk-adjusted returns are very consistent across all the currency pairs as most of 
the Sharpe ratios cluster around one. Again, the asymmetry observed above for Florence-
Venice as opposed to Venice-Florence is evident, as the former offers a much better return 
per unit of deviation than the latter (1.00 compared to 0.68). The same holds for transactions 
from Genoa to Bruges/Paris as opposed to the reverse. These figures bear close resemblance 
to their modern counterparts – for example, Lo calculates annual Sharpe ratios of between 0.5 
and 1.2 for a set of US mutual fund returns over periods of varying length ending in 2000.
65
 
This analysis shows that there was a considerable degree of risk involved in such transactions 
and so merchants engaging in exchange and rechange could legitimately argue that they were 
not usurious as their profits were not certain or fixed in advance.  
 In general, moderate levels of interest seem to have been accepted by the secular 
courts. The Venetian courts would enforce the collection of interest at moderate rates of 5-
12% per annum and English common law courts would award damages for late payment at a 
similar rate.
66
 The relatively rare examples of usury prosecutions tended to be short-lived and 
often politically-motivated.
67
 Most dramatically, in 1429, Florence banned dry exchange 
(cambium sine litteris). However, in 1435 this was suspended, initially for two years and it 
does not seem to have been revived subsequently. In any case, the Medici account books 
show that they were still engaging in such transactions in 1433.
68
  
 Whether this element of risk alone was sufficient to absolve merchants from the sin 
of usury is still debatable. Datini himself expressed ethical concerns, particularly as he grew 
older and more concerned with his ultimate fate. His friend, the Florentine notary Ser Lapo di 
Mazzei, warned him that ‘these exchanges, which you make at hazard, without any letter or 
coins, are as bad as playing at dice’. Simone d’Andrea, head of Datini’s branch in Barcelona, 
was the chief offender. In 1400, Datini wrote to him repeating a prohibition on such dealings, 
stating that ‘once for all, I would have you a merchant and not a banker’, and this criticism 
was repeated in 1402 and 1406.
69
 However, at the same time as he was castigating d’Andrea, 
Datini himself employed similar exchange and rechange transactions to lend money to a 
neighbour and to the heirs of a former business partner. In the latter case, he was criticised by 
one of his correspondents that it would have been cheaper to have borrowed by accepting a 
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term deposit a discrezione.
70
 Even the virtuous Mazzei asked Datini to withdraw money for 
him from a deposit issued by the Florentine wool gild at 8-10%.
71
 
 
VI. 
Overall, we argue that the use of exchange rates to calculate implicit interest rates is a 
valuable tool. First, it dramatically increases the number of interest rate observations available 
to the medieval historian. Second, it proves that interest rates were indeed incorporated into 
exchange rates in a systematic way. Third, it also paints a consistent picture of commercial 
interest rates at between 10 and 16%, which are comparable to the more scattered indications 
of returns on other forms of investment. Fourth, there was a high degree of variation in 
returns, which were not infrequently negative – the risk involved may have helped to justify 
the non-usurious nature of these transactions, although theologians and some merchants still 
had doubts. 
 This raises a question – why use bills of exchange as credit instruments if they were 
remained of questionable virtue and other, more straightforward, forms of charging interest 
were generally tolerated? In fact, when it came to their day-to-day business affairs, Florentine 
merchants seem to have employed their capital in undoubtedly ‘legitimate’ purposes such as 
trade or genuine transfers of funds using bills of exchange, while at the same time investing in 
more controversial instruments such as dry exchange, time deposits a discrezione, 
government debt and discounting for sales on credit.
72
 Such decisions were probably driven 
more by business considerations than moral ones. For instance, merchant manuals and books 
of advice stressed the importance of diversification as an investment strategy.
73
 In fact, as we 
have seen, the rates of return on all these classes of investment were broadly comparable. If 
the usury prohibition was, at least for this class of merchant, a dead letter, were there other 
reasons for using FX transactions in this way? 
  In fact, the extension of credit via exchange and rechange transactions did offer a 
number of advantages.
74
 First, it was extremely flexible. The variety of different currency 
pairs and usance periods between different cities made it possible to construct loans of 
varying lengths while exchange transactions could be rolled over an indefinite number of 
times by agreement. The best-documented are the short-term one month loans between 
Florence and Venice. By contrast, demand deposits did not usually pay interest while most 
time deposits were for six months or one year. At the same time, the use of FX transactions 
offered the lender slightly higher returns (for an acceptable degree of additional risk). They 
may be considered the medieval equivalent of money market funds. From a broader 
perspective, the FX market was of vital importance for medieval trade and economic activity. 
As we have seen, not all exchange transactions were used to create loans. If there were no 
local borrowers then the lender could buy a ‘genuine’ trading bill from merchants wishing to 
make actual transfers of funds for business purposes. Equally, a merchant seeking to fund his 
trading could transact with one of these financial ‘speculators’ rather than having to find a 
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counterparty wishing to transfer money in the opposite direction. One of the major difficulties 
facing early capital markets was ensuring sufficient ‘thickness’ and combining the FX and 
credit markets may have increased liquidity in both.
75
 
 Looking forward, the compilation of a larger and more internally consistent dataset of 
FX and interest rates will hopefully facilitate the use of more sophisticated quantitative 
methods to supplement the more qualitative evidence provided by other sources.  
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